The Substantive Limits of Liability for Inaccurate Predictions
By Hugh C. Beck1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent commentary regarding the forward-looking statement safe harbor created by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA” or “Reform Act”) 2 has focused on
the controversy sparked by Asher v. Baxter International, Inc.,3 a 2004 case in which the Seventh
Circuit reversed the dismissal of a complaint alleging fraudulent projections after finding that the
availability of the safe harbor could not be determined without discovery.4 Unfortunately, this
debate over the stage of litigation at which courts ought to apply the PSLRA safe harbor
provisions may obscure more fundamental issues left unsettled by the Reform Act regarding the
appropriate substantive limits of liability for inaccurate predictions.
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The stated policyobjective of the PSLRA safe harbor was “to enhance market efficiency
by encouraging companies to disclose forward-looking information.”5 Most studies of corporate
disclosure conducted following the Act’s passage, however, found no meaningful increase from
pre-Act levels in the disclosure of forward-looking information.6 Among other reasons for
managers’ reluctance to disclose more forward-looking information, observers cited ambiguities
in the language of the safe harbor’s provisions,7 including, most importantly, its first provision,
which protects an issuer from liability for an inaccurate forward-looking statement if the
statement “is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors
that could cause actual results to differ materially from those [predicted].”8 Nevertheless,
because this provision was widely viewed as codifying the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, many
commentators suggested that the courts would soon resolve the provision’s ambiguities by
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holding that its language was short-hand for this doctrine’s purportedly well-developed
principles.9
Nearly ten years have passed since commentators made these hopeful assessments of the
judiciary’s capacity to fine tune the PSLRA safe harbor provisions, but courts are no closer now
to a uniform approach to evaluating liability for inaccurate predictions than they were in 1997
when the first cases implicating the safe harbor were filed. Instead, it is rare that one can easily
discern the substantive criteria applied by the court within a given safe harbor opinion let alone
trends in the case law toward one particular approach to or another. Left without intelligible
judicial guidance, issuers tend to include long lists of unenlighteningcautionary statements and
risk factors in Commission filings and press releases containing predictive information,
apparently believing that the longer the list, the greater the likelihood that a court, regardless of
the criteria it applies, will find something in the list “meaningful.”
This article argues that two characteristics of the pre-PSLRA development of regulatory
and judicial approaches to forward-looking information are primarily responsible for the
continuing confusion in this area of the law. The first is a sharp, but heretofore unacknowledged,
doctrinal shift in early 1990s marked by In Re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation, a
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1993 case in which the Third Circuit held that appropriately tailored accompanying statements
render a projection immaterial.10 The second is the pre-1993 proliferation of imprecise
vocabularies that refer to a single set of concepts of liability but fail to adequately elucidate the
judicial inquiries entailed by these concepts. The article further demonstrates that either the SEC
or the Supreme Court could take advantage of the flexible language of the PSLRA safe harbor
and eliminate both of these sources of confusion by steering the lower courts into a single,
clearly articulated framework for assessing liability for inaccurate forward-looking statements.
Part II lays the foundation for these arguments by demonstrating that, with rare
exceptions, all regulatory and judicial approaches to forward-looking information employed
from the passage of the federal securities acts through the early 1990s (including the pre-1993
bespeaks caution doctrine) conformed to a single doctrinal framework. The framework’s
underlying assumption is that disclosures of forward-looking information tend to significantly
influence investor behavior or, in other words, that such information is generally material.
Accordingly, the framework’s primary inquiry is whether the forward-looking information in
question was false or misleading.11 This determination is made by evaluating whether a
“reasonable” investor would have drawn from the publication of the information the incorrect
inferences that allegedly misled the plaintiff. To the extent a reasonable investor would have
drawn those inferences they constitute implied misrepresentations, actionable under the securities
laws unless, due to exceptional circumstances, they would not have significantly influenced a
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reasonable investor’s decision-making process. Part II demonstrates that t he often dramatic
changes in regulatory policy from the mid-1930s to the early 1990s, as well as the
inconsistencies in cases involving forward-looking information decided during this time period,
generally reflect evolving conceptions of the reasonable investor rather than departures from this
basic doctrinal framework.
To be sure, the opinions in pre-1993 cases involving forward-looking information
generally, and the bespeaks caution opinions in particular, leavemuch to be desired in terms of
rhetorical precision and, in many cases, suggest that the judges who wrote the opinions failed to
fully grasp the traditional framework’s structure. For example, language in some of the circuit
court bespeaks caution opinions appears to establish a per se rule against liability for a failed
projection accompanied by cautionary statements. Nevertheless, the underlying basis for all of
these courts’ decisions was an intuitive judgment, however poorly articulated, that the
disclosures accompanying the projection or other factors made the incorrect inferences the
plaintiff allegedly drew from the disclosure of the projection unreasonable and that the disclosure
therefore would not have misled a reasonable investor regarding the probability of the projected
outcome.
Part III explains how the Third Circuit, in its opinion in Trump, was able to successfully
redirect the course of forward-looking statement analysis by exploiting the ambiguities in the
earlier bespeaks caution opinions and misreading Supreme Court precedent. In 1991, the
Supreme Court, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, applied the traditional framework in a
manner that should have ensured its application in future lower court cases involving allegedly
misleading forward-looking information.12 In its Trump opinion issued two years later, the Third
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Circuit transformed the bespeaks caution doctrine into a single-factor materiality test and
asserted that its “analysis comport[ed] with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Virginia
Bankshares.” As Part III demonstrates, however, it is impossible to reconcile the Trump
materiality analysis with the doctrinal framework endorsed in Virginia Bankshares.
Nevertheless, because courts and commentators failed to recognize that the Third Circuit’s
analysis represented a sharp departure from the previous line of “bespeaks caution” cases, lower
courts in subsequent cases generally took as granted that the “bespeaks caution” doctrine was, as
the Third Circuit had held, a materiality-based approach to assessing the actionability of
inaccurate forward-looking information. Against this background of unwitting judicial
acquiescence to the Third Circuit’s reformulation of the bespeaks caution doctrine, congressional
negotiations over private securities litigation reform ultimately produced the PSLRA in 1995.
As a result, since the PSLRA’s enactment, courts and commentators have often taken as granted
that the first provision of the Act’s safe harbor “codifies the materiality standard set forth in
[Trump] and reiterated in numerous other circuits, and makes that standard uniform
nationwide.”13
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Part IV argues that this view of the safe harbor is misguided for several reasons, not the
least of which is its inconsistency with the provisions’ underlying logic. The link between the
safe harbor’s policy objective (enhancing allocative efficiency) and its means (increasing the
disclosure of forward-looking information) disappears if one discards the premise that investor
behavior will be influenced by the disclosures induced by the safe harbor.14 Put another way, if
to satisfy the first provision’s test for meaningfulness, accompanying statements must render a
forward-looking statement immaterial, then most forward-looking statements that qualify for
protection under that provision do not contain the kind of information Congress hoped issuers
would disclose in greater quantities in response to the legislation. A statutory interpretation that
produces such a stark disconnect between the statute’s operation and its policy objectives must
exhibit other compelling virtues or be discarded. Part IV demonstrates, however, that the
materiality-based interpretation continues to fare poorly when measured against other important
criteria. Fortunately, the language of the safe harbor permits a falsity-based interpretation of the
first safe harbor provision and, if properly grounded in thetraditional doctrinal framework , this
interpretation resolves the defects to which the materiality-based interpretation is subject. Part
IV concludes with a brief discussion of the key benefits well-crafted SEC or Supreme Court
interpretive intervention with respect to the PSLRA safe harbor provisions could yield.
II.

PRE-PSLRA REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL
DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
A.

The Evolution of the SEC’s Conception of the Reasonable Investor

From the creation of the SEC in 1934 through the early 1970s, the Commission
continuously discouraged public disclosure of forward-looking information and maintained that
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the disclosure of business projections in SEC filings was per se misleading. Although not
immediately apparent, this policy was rooted in the doctrinal framework described in Part I. As
a result, statements by courts and commentators from this era regarding the Commission’s policy
frequently reflect the framework’s basic contours. For example, in 1961, former senior SEC
staffer Harry Heller, describing the justification for the Commission’s policy and decisions by
courts in line with that policy, stated: “[A]ttempts by companies to predict future earnings on
their own or on the authority of experts have almost invariably been held to be misleading
because they suggest to the investor a competence and authority which in fact does not exist.”15
Similarly, in the 1964 case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway
Co.,16 the court noted that the publication of predictions leads investors to “readily to assume,
contrary to fact, that the predictor has special knowledge or unique information to bear out fully
his prediction, and be induced to rely upon a supposed expert judgment of the mysteries of
finance.”17 The court then found the predictions at issue misleading because they “convey[ed] a
certitude which inherently they [could not] possess.”18 As discussed in Part I, the evaluation of
such unstated propositions (reflected by Heller’s emphasis on what the publication of a
prediction “suggest[s] to the investor” and Northwestern’s discussion regarding facts a prediction
causes investors to “readily to assume”) is the traditional doctrinal framework's central analysis.
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In addition to demonstrating the consistency of the SEC’s policy with the traditional
framework, the statement by Heller reflects the paternalistic conception of the average investor
that prevailed at the Commission for the first several decades of its existence.19 Throughout this
time period, protecting investors from their own errors of judgment was one of the
Commission’s primary objectives. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, new insights regarding the
operation of markets and investor behavior called the Commission’s focus on protecting the
unsophisticated into question. In 1967, the SEC formed an internal study group led by
Commissioner Francis M. Wheat to examine the securities laws’ corporate disclosure system.20
Reflecting the emerging view that investors are generally sophisticated enough to discount
expected earnings in an effort to identify misvalued stocks, the Wheat Report acknowledged that
“most investment decisions are based essentially on estimates of future earnings.” Nevertheless,
the Wheat report concluded that the “real danger . . . that projections appearing in [documents
filed with the SEC] would be accorded a greater measure of validity by the unsophisticated than
they would deserve” outweighed the benefits of permitting disclosure.21 Skepticism regarding
the Commission’s traditional policy continued to mount, however, and just two years later the
Commission held public hearings regarding potential changes to the policy.22
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In early 1973, the Commission announced thatas a result of the hearings it had
determined that “changes in its present policies with regard to the use of projections would assist
in the protection of investors and would be in the public interest.”23 Two years later, the
Commission published proposed rules for implementing these changes. The rules outlined an
elaborate set of procedures for integrating projections into Commission filings and proposed an
equally complex projection safe harbor.24 Demonstrating the ongoing pull of the Commission’s
traditional conception of the average investor as unsophisticated, the proposed safe harbor,
among its many other requirements, required that a published projection be accompanied by a
statement “cautioning that there can be no assurance that the projection will be achieved.”25
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reporting companies and who meet certain standards relating to their earnings histories and budgeting experience.”
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In response to widespread objections to the complexity of the proposed safe harbor and
projection disclosure requirements, the SEC tabled the proposals in April 1976 pending
completion of a new study on disclosure by an advisory committee appointed by the Commission
two months earlier.26 Referencing the “increasing body of scholarly work examining the
economics and structure of information systems . . . [with] increasing consideration [being] given
to the ‘random walk theory’ and the efficient market hypothesis,”27 the Commission had formed
the advisory committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the securities laws’ corporate
disclosure system and recommend changes to the Commission’s policies.28 According to the
efficient market hypothesis, even the most savvy investors will be unable to consistently identify
undervalued or overvalued securities because security prices in active markets continuously
reflect the views of other market participants that, in the aggregate, take into account all
available market information. The flip side of the hypothesis is that even the most misguided
participants in active markets will be unable to consistently make bad investment decisions. By

Commission’s Findings on Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance by Issuers of Publicly Traded
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Securities Act Release No. 33,5581 (April 28, 1975) at 13.
26
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since some managements may wish to furnish their projections through Commission filings,” the SEC would no
longer “object to the disclosure in filings with the Commission of projections which are made in good faith and have
a reasonable basis, provided that they are . . . accompanied by information adequate for investors to make their own
judgments.” Id. at 4. The Commission then proposed non-binding Division of Corporation Finance “Disclosure of
Projections of Future Performance” guides under both the Securities Act and Exchange Act.26 The guides suggest
that the Commission’s views regarding the meaning of the reasonable basis requirement and the adequacy of
accompanying information had not changed. With respect to the reasonable basis requirement the release noted:
“The [Division of Corporation Finance] believes that management should have the option to present in Commission
filings its good faith assessment of a company’s future performance. Management must, however, have a
reasonable basis for such an assessment. A history of operations or experience in projecting may be among the
factors providing a basis for management’s assessment.” Id. at 7. With regard to the importance of accompanying
information the guides stated: “[T]he Division believes that investor understanding would be enhanced by disclosure
of the assumptions which in management’s opinion are most significant to the projections or are the key factors
upon which the financial results of the enterprise depend.” Id. at 11-12.
27
Securities Act Release No. 33,5673 at 3.
28
Id. See also Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, supra note 15, at D-3.
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crediting this proposition, the advisory committee embraced a conception of the average or
reasonable investor as sophisticated and, as a result, concerns about protecting unsophisticated
investors carried little weight in the advisory committee’s deliberations. In fact, unlike the
previous debates regarding public disclosure of forward-looking information, debate among the
advisory committee members focused not on the whether the Commission should allow
projections, but on whether it should require them as a means of enhancing pricing accuracy.29
In the end, the committee recommended that the Commission should only “encourage
issuers to publish forward-looking . . . information” and proposed a simple issuer-friendly safe
harbor rule as the primary means to achieve that goal.30 In contrast to the web of requirements
contained in the Commission’s safe harbor proposal, the advisory committee’s proposed rule
required only that management have “a reasonable basis” for its projections and disclose the
projections “in good faith.”31 In addition, although the committee observed that the disclosure of
a projection’s assumptions “provides a framework for analysis of the projection,” it
recommended that “to maximize the attractiveness of the program to registrants . . . the
disclosure of assumptions should only be encouraged, rather than formally required.”32
In 1978, the Commission simultaneously published two releases in response to the
advisory committee’s recommendations. In the first release, the Commission proposed an
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Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, supra note 15, 347-357.
The Committee’s report noted that its proposed disclosure program was designed to “permit[] wide
latitude to companies issuing projections.” Id. at 353. In contrast to the Commission’s earlier proposal, the
Committee recommended that “all public companies should be eligible to [disclose internal projections]” regardless
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was no evidence to “‘suggest that the “size” of the company has anything to do with the reliability of its
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alternative safe harbor rule that used the committee’s “reasonable basis” and “good faith”
terminology but omitted several issuer-friendly components of the committee’s proposal.33
While the proposed rule did not explicitly require assumption disclosure as the Commission’s
earlier proposal had, in a companion release the Commission suggested that failure to disclose
assumptions could render projections misleading:
[U]nder certain circumstances the disclosure of underlying assumptions may be
material to an understanding of the projected results: For example, where
projected results are based to a significant degree upon the introduction of a new
product or service meeting certain anticipated levels of sales and contribution to
earnings, disclosure of the projection without this information might be
misleading.34
This discussion reflects a nuanced conception of the reasonable investor, under which the
reasonable investor avoids inferring from the publication of a projection unaccompanied by
disclosure of underlying assumptions that projected results are guaranteed but is entitled to infer
that the unexplained estimate has, by some standard, a typical confidence level or error rate.35 In
other words, where there are factors that give rise to an unusually low confidence level or high

33

See Proposed Safe Harbor Rule For Projections, Securities Act Release No. 33,5993 (Nov. 7, 1978). The
Commission’s proposed safe harbor would have covered only projections made by public companies and placed the
burden of proof on the defendant to show that the projection had a reasonable basis and was disclosed in good faith.
See id. at 5-7. With respect to the burden of proof, the Release noted that: “The Commission is proposing the rule in
this manner since it is concerned that the burden imposed on a plaintiff -- including the Commission -- could be
insurmountable. It would be extremely difficult to prove the absence of a reasonable basis or good faith, especially
as to plaintiffs who would not have the Commission’s investigatory procedures available and cannot engage in
discovery prior to the filing of a complaint alleging a violation.” Id. In the end, however, the Commission reversed
its position based on criticism that placing the burden of proof on defendants “would deter companies from making
projections, thereby negating the Commission’s objective” and “would in all likelihood increase the institution of
frivolous, nuisance litigation based solely on the failure of the results to match projections.” Safe Harbor Rule For
Projections, Securities Act Release No. 33,6084 (June 25, 1979) at 3. The Commission also slightly expanded the
coverage of the safe harbor beyond projections made by public companies by making the safe harbor applicable to
forward-looking statements contained in registrations statements relating to initial public offerings. Due in part to
its “continuing concern regarding the selective disclosure of forward-looking information,” however, the
Commission ultimately determined that “[s]tatements made outside of [Commission filings would] be covered by
the rule only if they [were also] included in documents filed with the Commission.” Id. at 7. The final rules were
adopted as Rule 3b(6) under the Exchange Act and Rule 175 under the Securities Act. 12 C.F.R. § 563d.3b-6 (2001).
The the two rules are identical with the exception of their references to the Acts under which they were adopted.
34
Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No.
33,5992 (Nov. 7, 1978) at 16.
35
See supra note 25 for a description of the terms “confidence level” and “error rate.”
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error rate, those factors must be disclosed to prevent the projection from misleading the
reasonable investor.
Apparently in an effort to persuade courts to this view, the Commission affirmed in its
final release announcing its adoption of the safe harbor that “the key assumptions underlying a
forward-looking statement are of such significance that their disclosure may [] be necessary in
order for such statements to meet the reasonable basis and good faith standards embodied in the
rule.” 36 The success of this effort was not tested until more than a decade later in the Seventh
Circuit case of Weiglos v. Commonwealth Edison.37 Weiglos involved cost estimates that proved

36

Safe Harbor Rule For Projections, Securities Act Release No. 33,6084 (June 25, 1979) at 6.
892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989). Weiglos is apparently the only reported circuit court case to address
whether Rule 175 requires assumption disclosure. The limited case law on this issue, however, is not surprising
because, as a consequence of the Commission’s decision to restrict the coverage of the rule to statements included in
Commission filings, Rule 175 was implicated in only a fraction of the subsequent cases involving forward-looking
information. Nevertheless, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, D.C. and Eighth
Circuits all applied variations of the Rule 175 test to evaluate the falsity of projections not included in Commission
filings. See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d. Cir. 1985) (“[A]n opinion that has been issued without a
genuine belief or reasonable basis is an ‘untrue’ statement….”); Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc. 847 F.2d 186,
203-204 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Most often, whether liability is imposed depends on whether the predictive statement was
‘false’ when it was made. The answer to this inquiry, however, does not turn on whether the prediction in fact
proved to be wrong; instead, falsity is determined by examining the nature of the prediction--with the emphasis on
whether the prediction suggested reliability, bespoke caution, was made in good faith, or had a sound factual or
historical basis.”); Rubinstein v. Collins 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994) (“In sum, a predictive statement is one
that contains at least three factual assertions that may be actionable: 1) The speaker genuinely believes the statement
is accurate; 2) there is a reasonable basis for that belief; and 3) the speaker is unaware of any undisclosed facts that
would tend seriously to undermine the accuracy of the statement.”); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp. 16 F.3d
1271, 1277 (DC Cir. 1994) (“[P]rojections and statements of optimism are false and misleading for the purposes of
the securities laws if they were issued without good faith or lacked a reasonable basis when made.”); Eckstein v.
Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1132 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[P]redictions that don’t pan out can lead to Rule 10b-5
liability only if the prediction was unreasonable in light of the information available at the time the statement was
made.”); Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc. 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] projection can lead to
liability under Rule 10b-5 only if it was not made in good faith or was made without a reasonable basis.”); Exeter
Bancorporation, Inc. v. Kemper Securities Group, Inc. 58 F.3d 1306, 1113 (8th Cir., 1995) (“That the [expected
outcome] eventually did not materialize is not, by itself, enough to create an inference that the statement was false
when made; other evidence is required to show that [the defendant] did not believe, or lacked reason to believe, [the
basis for the prediction] at the time it made the statement. Fraud is not shown simply because an expected
occurrence did not occur.”); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co. 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Isquith v.
Middle South Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 204 (5th Cir.)) (“In determining whether the statements are actionable, the
court must scrutinize the nature of the statement to determine whether the statement was false when made. While
analyzing the nature of the statement, the court must emphasize whether the ‘prediction suggested reliability,
bespoke caution, was made in good faith, or had a sound factual or historical basis.’”); and San Leandro Emergency
Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. 75 F.3d 801, 813 (2nd Cir. 1996) (“Finally,
with respect to the company’s forward-looking statements, plaintiffs have not alleged circumstances to show that the
defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their optimistic, but qualified, predictions as to the company’s future
37
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inaccurate. In an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook, the court considered whether the
defendant’s estimates failed to meet Rule 175’s reasonable basis test because the accompanying
disclosures “did not assist anyone in estimating how likely (and how great) a departure from its
point estimates would be.”38 In the court’s view, this failure alone was not enough to push
inaccurate predictions out of the Rule 175 safe harbor. According to Judge Easterbrook,
requiring “issuer[s] to reveal all of the data, assumptions, and methodology behind [their]
projections, so that participants in the market could assess them fully and react appropriately”
could make the safe harbor “impossible to enter” because the disclosure of such information
would frequently impair the companies’ competitive position.39 Thus, the reasonable investor,
understanding a company’s need to safeguard proprietary information, both “infers from what is
said and what is omitted how reliable the estimate is”40 or, in other words, does not automatically
infer an industry-typical confidence level or error rate from the absence of assumption
disclosures.
Although the conclusions of the Seventh Circuit in Weiglos and the Commission of the
late 1970s with respect to assumption disclosure are at odds, their approaches can be easily
reconciled by blending their alternative conceptions of the reasonable investor. Under this

performance.”). Most of these decisions do not provide significant insight into the relevance of accompanying
disclosures to the evaluation of whether a projection was made in good faith or had a reasonable basis. Still, the use
of these and similar terms in the opinions reflects the decisions’ conformity to the traditional doctrinal framework in
the same way that the Commission’s use of the good faith/reasonable basis language in its rule-making deliberations
reflects the Commission’s conformity to the traditional doctrinal framework during its 1970s rulemaking process
that produced Rule 175. To say that a projection must be made in good faith is simply to say that investors are
entitled to infer that management does not know of undisclosed information that discredits the projection. Similarly,
to say that a projection must have a reasonable basis is simply to say that investors are entitled to draw certain
inferences about facts underlying a published prediction in order to make judgments about the subject matter of the
prediction or, in other words, regarding its confidence level/error rate. Whether an investor was entitled to draw a
particular incorrect inference about the subject matter of the published prediction is determined by the conception of
the reasonable investor that a judge or jury combines with this general proposition.
38
892 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1989).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 515.
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blended conception, the reasonable investor does not expect companies to reveal a projection’s
underlying assumptions if such disclosures would materially compromise the company’s
competitive position; the reasonable investor may assume, however, that if there are known
factors that are likely to cause a significant departure from a projected results and disclosure of
those factors would not pose a material risk to the company’s business, any cautionary
statements accompanying the projection will disclose those factors.
B. The Development of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: A New Label for the Concepts of the
Traditional Doctrinal Framework
The Eighth Circuit coined the “bespeaks caution” phrase one year before the adoption of
Rule 175 in Polin v. Conductron.41 Both Polin and the Second Circuit’s much more widely cited
“bespeaks caution” decision eight years later in Luce v. Edlelstein42 held only that the boilerplate
warnings accompanying projections prevent reasonable investors from drawing the inference that
the predicted results are guaranteed. As noted above, the SEC accepted this unremarkable
proposition in the early 1970s and by the end of that decade had apparently concluded that
reasonable investors generally do not infer from the publication of a forecast that the predicted
results are guaranteed even if the publication fails to warn against drawing that inference. The
first circuit court opinions to use the “bespeaks caution” language as short-hand for their
conclusions that disclosures accompanying predictions rendered unreasonable investors’
inferences regarding the predictions’ error rate or confidence level did not appear until 1991.
This section demonstrates that all of these pre-1993 circuit courtdecisions were rooted in th e
traditional framework for assessing the actionability of inaccurate predictions, notwithstanding
language in several of the opinions that appears to reflect a more formulaic approach.

41
42

552 F.2d 797 (1977).
802 F.2d 49 (1986).
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1. Preventing the Mistaken Inference that Forecasted Results are Guaranteed
Polin involved loss estimates on the sale of aircraft cockpit simulators.43 The
manufacturer of the simulators allocated its research and development costs to the simulators on
a proportional basis.44 When the manufacturer learned that revenues from the sale of some of the
simulators would be inadequate to recover the costs allocated to their production, it began
disclosing loss estimates in its annual reports.45 The plaintiffs alleged that (1) the manufacturer
intentionally understated these estimates and (2) statements in the manufacturer’s annual report
that “results for 1968 were ‘expected’ to show improvement” and that it “saw a ‘possibility’ of a
break-even soon” were false.46 Observing that “[t]he terms . . . employed bespeak caution in
outlook” and “recognize the imponderable influences of complex variables in a fast-changing
field,” the court held the manufacturer’s statements fell “far short of the assurances required for a
finding of falsity and fraud.”47 Stated otherwise, the court’s “bespeaks caution” holding was
simply that the use of language to present a projection that “recognizes” the inherent uncertainty
of its future results requires investors to recognize that uncertainty as well rather than taking the
statements as an “assurance” of the predicted outcomes. The court’s observation thus mirrors the
conclusion implicit in the SEC’s early 1970s releases that the accompaniment of a projection
with a statement cautioning against the inference that the results predicted are guaranteed is
sufficient to prevent a reasonable investor from drawing that inference.48

43

552 F.2d 797 (1977).
Id. at 801.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 802.
47
Id. at 807.
48
By itself, the court’s “bespeaks caution” statement could easily be read to suggest that a projection
cannot be false or fraudulent unless it is stated as an assurance of future outcomes. It is unlikely, however, that the
Eighth Circuit intended to endorse this proposition. The loss estimates were also not stated as assurances and the
court did not base its conclusion that those estimates were not fraudulent on that fact. Instead, it relied on the district
court finding that there was “no substantial basis for the contention that any of the reports withheld material
information or fraudulently minimized losses which should have been anticipated.” 552 F.2d at 807. Presumably,
44
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After Polin, nearly a decade passed before the Second Circuit used the Eighth Circuit’s
“bespeaks caution” terminology to describe its own holding in Luce v. Edelstein49 that cautionary
language could immunize inaccurate projections.50 In Luce, the plaintiffs were investors in a
partnership created to construct and sell condominium units. Their complaint alleged multiple
violations of Rule 10b-5 including that the offering memorandum “contained intentional
misrepresentations as to the potential cash and tax benefits of the partnership.”51 The district
court found that none of the plaintiffs’ allegations had been pleaded with the level of
particularity required by Rule 9(b) and dismissed the complaint on that basis.52
On appeal, the Second Circuit read the investors’ allegation regarding the cash and tax
benefits to assert that the offering memorandum implicitly guaranteed that the projected tax and
cash benefits would be realized.53 The Court then held that this allegation did not state a 10(b)
claim because:

then, had the plaintiffs been able to show that the manufacturer had withheld information suggesting that there was
no “‘possibility’ of a break-even,” its use of language that “recognize[d] the imponderable influences of complex
variables in a fast-changing field” would not have insulated the break-even projection from liability.
49
802 F.2d at 51. Luce, rather than Polin, is seen as the progenitor of the bespeaks caution doctrine. See
e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution”, 49 BUS. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 481, 481.
50
During this time period, more than thirty published circuit and district court opinions cited other parts of
the Polin opinion. Polin’s “bespeaks caution” statements, however, were first cited in the Second Circuit’s 1985
decision in Goldman vs. Belden 754 F.2d 1059 (1985), three years before the Second Circuit again cited this
language in Luce. Unlike the Luce court, the Goldman court found that the plaintiff’s complaint (which alleged
“that defendants made a series of very positive predictions without qualifications . . . while they . . . knew of many
flaws in [their principal product]”) stated a valid 10b-5 claim even though the court determined that the predictions
were not “quite as unqualified as the [c]omplaint alleged.” Id. at 1065.
51
802 F.2d at 56. The complaint also alleged that the offering memorandum represented that the general
partners would take certain actions that they never intended to take and that the defendants mismanaged partnership
property. Id. at 55-56.
52
Id. at 53. The district court also suggested that even if the allegations had satisfied Rule 9(b) the court
would have still dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because, in its view, “most of the activities
alleged [were] not even colorably within the purview of §10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.” Id. at 55. Accordingly, the
district court did not grant the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. Id. at 53.
53
This reading of the complaint by the court was primarily based on the complaint’s allegations that the
“defendants made oral and written representations to plaintiffs and the class regarding their returns on investment
and cash and tax benefits apart from the offering memorandum.” Id. at 54 (emphasis added). In light of these
allegations, the court took the complaint’s discussion of “intentional misrepresentation” regarding these cash and tax
benefits in the offering memorandum to allege that the offering memorandum served to confirm the oral and written
assurances.
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the Offering Memorandum made it quite clear that its projections of potential cash
and tax benefits were “necessarily speculative in nature” and that “[n]o assurance
[could] be given that these projections [would] be realized.” Indeed, the Offering
Memorandum warned prospective investors that “[a]ctual results may vary from
the predictions and these variations may be material.” We are not inclined to
impose liability on the basis of statements that clearly “bespeak caution.”54
Thus, as in Polin, the Luce bespeaks caution holding was simply a restatement of the SEC’s
position that generic warnings are sufficient to prevent the inference that the projected results are
guaranteed.55
Thus understood, both Polin and Luce were firmly rooted in the traditional doctrinal
framework. The plaintiffs in both cases asserted, at least as the courts read their complaints, that
they took the predictions at issue as guarantees. Both courts, however, found that the respective
accompanying disclosures rendered this inference unreasonable. As a result, the courts
concluded that even though the predictions turned out to be inaccurate they were not misleading
when they were made.
2. The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine and Assumption Disclosure
Following Luce, the “bespeaks caution” language did not appear in another circuit court
opinion until 1991, when the First, Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits cited either Luce, Polin, or

54

Id. at 56 (citing Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 n. 28 (8th Cir. 1977)).
The substance of the warning in the partnership’s offering memorandum was essentially
indistinguishable from the warning set forth in the SEC 1975 safe harbor proposal, which would have required
issuers to alert investors that “there can be no assurance that the projection will be achieved.” Notice of Proposed
Rule 132, Securities Act Release No. 33,5581 (April 28, 1975) at 13. This reading of the Luce court’s “bespeaks
caution” holding is supported by the court’s subsequent discussion overturning the district court’s refusal to grant
the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. Although the court stated that “allegations that relate to the
mismanagement of the project” could not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “even if made with more particularity,”
802 F.2d at 56, it provided specific guidance as to how the misleading projection allegations could be rewritten to
pass muster under both Rule 9(b) and Rule 12(b)(6): “Amendments [to the complaint] relating to projections or
expectations offered to induce investments must allege particular facts demonstrating the knowledge of defendants
at the time that such statements were false.” Id. Obviously, the court would not have given this instruction if its
disinclination “to impose liability on the basis of statements that clearly ‘bespeak caution’” had been
insurmountable. Accordingly, had the plaintiffs followed the Second Circuit’s instruction and amended their
complaint to allege that they inferred from the projections that the predicted outcomes were more likely than not
(instead of that the projections were implicit guarantees) and that the defendants at the time of the offering held
documents, such as IRS private ruling letters, indicating that the predicted tax benefits were extremely unlikely to be
realized, the district court would have been unable to dismiss the amended complaint.
55
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both in connection with their holdings that inaccurate predictions did not give rise to liability.56
All four of these decisions were rooted in the traditional doctrinal framework. The two most
instructive opinions, the First Circuit’s opinion in Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton57 and the
Second Circuit’s opinion in I. Meyers Pincus & Associates, P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.,58
both reflect the view that cautionary statements disclosing specific underlying assumptions may
do more than simply prevent the inference that the projected results are guaranteed.59
In Romani, the general partners’ offering materials contained several optimistic
predictions of future success of the partnership's horse breeding operations, including expected

56

In 1988, the Fifth Circuit cited the Luce court’s “bespeaks caution” holding but only in connection with
an effort to summarize principles of law relating to predictive statements that it hoped would guide the lower court
on remand. Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc. 847 F.2d 186, 203-204 (5th Cir. 1988).
57
929 F.2d 875 (1991).
58
936 F.2d 759 (1991).
59
The two other cases that cited Luce were Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir., 1991) and
Sinay v. Lamson, 948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir., 1991). Moorhead appears to stand for the unremarkable proposition that
disclosures of specific underlying assumptions are just as effective as blanket warnings in preventing the inference
that projected results are guaranteed. The case involved an underwritten sale of bonds to finance the construction
and operation of a retirement center. The offering materials attached a “generally favorable” study generated by an
independent feasibility consultant that disclosed in great detail the assumptions on which the feasibility of the debt
repayment was based. Within a year after construction was completed, however, the center became unable to
service the debt and soon thereafter filed for bankruptcy protection. The investors alleged that the “defendant . . .
knowingly or recklessly issued the feasibility study which misrepresented that sufficient revenues would be
generated to pay back the debt.” (emphasis added) Id. at 245. Thus, it appears that the investors, like the Luce
plaintiffs, asserted that the feasibility study implicitly assured investors that the center would be able to service the
bonds. Without extended analysis, the court, citing Polin and Luce, upheld the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendant: “We agree with the district court and hold that plaintiffs could not base a federal
securities fraud claim on any misrepresentation . . . in the feasibility study which was addressed by the repeated,
specific warnings of significant risk factors and the disclosures of underlying factual assumptions also contained
therein.” Id. Although the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co. provides very little doctrinal
discussion of the bespeaks caution doctrine, its application of the doctrine appears to be consistent with the
reasoning of the Romani court discussed infra pp. 20-21. In Sinay, a manufacturer of construction and
transportation equipment products experienced a severe slow down after several years of rapid earnings growth. 948
F.2d at 1038. The plaintiffs alleged that a company officer’s statement (made before the slow down became public)
that he did “not quarrel with analysts’ earnings estimates in the area of $1.50 to $1.60” was misleading. Id. at 1039.
The court identified various specific risk factors accompanying the statement and then without any discussion of the
factors stated that “[i]n light of the cautionary language, [the officer’s] statement . . . is hardly the type of statement
that would mislead a reasonable investor.” Id. at 1040. The court then noted that its decision was also based on the
fact that “the plaintiffs did not offer any objective evidence that the [forecasts] were anything other than honestly
held convictions based on the historical information which Lamson possessed.” Accordingly, the absence any
discussion of the accompanying risk disclosures does not suggest that the court intended to adopt a bright-line rule
that predictions accompanied by such disclosures are non-actionable per se, that is, non-actionable even if the
predictions are not “honestly held convictions” or based on reliable information.
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partnership “cash distributions in excess of 13%.”60 Romani asserted that the predictions were
misleading because the defendants did not disclose that “the standardbred horse industry was
entering a recessionary period, making past performance an imperfect indicator of the future.”61
The court rejected this assertion because a report attached to the prospectus “detailed a number
of specific problems facing the standardbred industry, including overbreeding, declining
attendance at races and an average decline in yearling prices.”62 Accordingly, the court
concluded:
[A]lthough the offering materials were optimistic about the prospects for [the
partnership], the documents unquestionably warned potential investors in a
meaningful way that economic conditions in the horsebreeding industry were
uncertain. Documents such at this, which “clearly ‘bespeak caution,’” are not the
stuff of which securities fraud claims are made.63
In contrast to the plaintiffs in Polin and Luce, Romani did not allege that the 13% cash
distribution or any of the other predictions amounted to a guarantee. Instead, Romani alleged
that the projection suggested that the partnership’s past performance was likely to continue and
that this suggestion was false. The court’s response was that the disclosures regarding several
specific contingencies the occurrence of any of which would cause actual results to differ
significantly from those projected made reading the projection to imply such a representation
unreasonable. The Romani court’s analysis thus mirrors the position implicit in the SEC’s 1978
and 1979 releases that a projection with a low confidence level or high error rate may remain
reasonably based if the factors giving rise to the uncertainties are disclosed.

60

929 F.2d at 877.
Id. at 877.
62
Id. at 879.
63
Id.
61
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In I. Meyers Pincus & Associates, P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.,64 the defendant,
Oppenheimer, offered shares of a closed-end fund in a registered public offering. In its
prospectus, Oppenheimer noted that: “The shares of closed-end investment companies frequently
trade at a discount from or premium to their net asset values. The Shares are also expected to
trade at a discount or premium.”65 Although Oppenheimer also stated in another section of the
prospectus that “[s]hares of closed-end investment companies frequently trade at a discount from
net asset value, but in some cases trade at a premium,”66 the plaintiff asserted that the first
statement suggested that the shares were “as likely to trade at a premium as at a discount” and
that this suggestion was misleading because “shares of closed-end investment companies
‘usually and typically sell at discounts’ from the net asset value.”67
After observing that “[t]he central inquiry in determining whether a prospectus is
materially misleading . . . is . . . whether defendant’s representations, taken together and in
context, would have misled a reasonable investor about the nature of the investment,”68 the court
concluded that the “discount or premium” statement, read in the context of the other statements
in the prospectus, was not misleading: “The statements contained within the prospectus clearly
“bespeak caution,’ rather than encouraging optimism. . . . No reasonable investor would be
misled by the prospectus into believing that the Fund was predicting the success of its shares in a
secondary market for them.”69 Of all the pre-1993 circuit court bespeaks caution cases,

64

936 F.2d 759 (2nd Cir. 1991).
Id. at 761.
66
Id. at 762.
67
Id. at 761.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 763. The court clearly did not intend to hold that one may always escape liability by discouraging
optimism. For example, had plaintiff made credible allegations that the defendant was aware of undisclosed fundspecific factors that made the fund’s shares abnormally likely to trade at a discount, the relevant incorrect inference
would not be that the shares were as likely to trade at a premium as at discount, but instead that they were not more
likely to trade at a discount than the “average” closed end fund. It is unlikely that statements in the prospectus
would have rendered this incorrect inference unreasonable.
65
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Oppenheimer’s discussion most explicitly reflects the contours of the traditional doctrinal
framework. In the Second Circuits’s view, Oppenheimer’s accompanying disclosures rendered
unreasonable the inference that the plaintiff allegedly drew regarding the likelihood that the
shares would trade at a premium. Accordingly, the court found that the prediction itself was not
misleading even though the fund’s shares failed to trade at a premium.
III.

EXITING THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK: THE BESPEAKS CAUTION
DOCTRINE AS A MATERIALITY TEST

Liability under all of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws requires, at a
minimum, falsity and materiality. The Oppenheimer court’s observation that “the central
inquiry” in determining whether projections are “materially misleading” is whether they “would
have misled a reasonable investor,”70 highlights the priority that the traditional doctrinal
framework gives to the inquiry into the falsity of a projection. The courts in all of the pre-1993
bespeaks caution cases viewed the inquiry into whether a forward-looking statement was
misleading or “false when made” as the “central inquiry” because they assumed that such falsity,
if established, would likely be material. Throughout the gradual reversal of the SEC’s position
on the disclosure of projections discussed above, the Commission and the courts operated under
the same assumption.71
Because virtually allpre -1993 approaches to forward-looking information placed the
falsity inquiry ahead of the materiality inquiry, their development rarely crossed paths with the
development of materiality doctrine during this period. In contrast, the materiality, as well as the
falsity, of forward-looking information was contested in Virginia Banksharesv. Sandberg.

70

72

Id. at 761.
Without the assumption that the predictive information would typically influence investment decisions
the Commission’s policy prohibiting the disclosure of such information in Commission filings would have made
little sense. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
72
501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
71
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Virginia Bankshares should have guided
subsequent lower court analyses of both the falsity and materiality of forward-looking
information. This Part begins with a brief overview of the Court’s development of materiality
doctrine prior to Virginia Bankshares. It then reviews the principles of the Virginia Bankshares
falsity and materiality analyses and demonstrates their consistency with the traditional
framework for evaluating the actionability of inaccurate forward-looking information. Finally,
this Part reviews the Third Circuit’s analysis in Trump and contrasts the analysis with the
Virginia Bankshares materiality analysis to demonstrate that while courts and Congress accepted
Trump as an accurate articulation of the bespeaks caution doctrine, the Third Circuit’s approach
was in fact a fundamental departure from prior case law.
A. The Supreme Court’s Development of Materiality Doctrine
Lower courts applied a variety of materiality definitions from the 1930s through the late
1960s.73 In 1970, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to establish a uniform materiality
standard in Mills v. Electric by stating both that materiality “indubitably embodies a conclusion
that the defect was of such a character that it might have been considered important by a
reasonable shareholder” and that materiality requires that the “defect have a significant
propensity to affect” a shareholder’s decision making process.74 Six years later, in TSC

73

See generally E. C. Lashbrooke, Jr., The Alternative-Action Requirement: the Derailment of Sante Fe,
1981 DUKE L.J. 963, 972 (“Since the inception of an implied civil cause of action for a violation of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5, the federal courts have been formulating a definition of materiality. The test for materiality has
ranged from a realistic view to a reasonable man standard to a marketplace effects test.”)
74
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 378. Mills was decided in the middle of an era of
expansive interpretations of the federal securities laws by the courts. According to most commentators this era
began about 1965 and continued until 1975. See Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1058 (1983);
see also 1 Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis B. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud § 2.2, at 462 (2d ed.
1994). During this time period, the Supreme Court upheld various “implied rights of action” that many lower courts
had inferred from the federal securities acts and regulations, including Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14a-9. Starting in the
mid-1970s, the Supreme Court gradually pared back these implied rights of action. One of the perceived problems
targeted by the Court’s decisions was the purportedly unchecked multiplication of forms of liability based on rule
10b-5. The Court’s 1975 opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores contained its most explicit
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Industries v. Northway, Inc., the Court eliminated much of this ambiguity.75 The court of
appeals, citing Mills, had defined material facts as “all facts, which a reasonable shareholder
might consider important”76 and applying that definition found that alleged omissions from the
defendant’s proxy statement were material as a matter of law. Rejecting this standard as
“unnecessarily low,”77 the TSC Industries Court stated: “An omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote.”78
Although this “substantial likelihood” materiality standard raised the liability bar under
the securities laws in several circuits, the Court cautioned against the creation of standards
designed to permit courts to resolve materiality issues by summary judgment: “Only if the
established omissions are ‘so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot
differ on the question of materiality’ is the ultimate issue of materiality appropriately resolved
‘as a matter of law’ by summary judgment.”79 Just a few years later, however, the Third Circuit
disregarded this instruction and developed a single-factor materiality test under which a judge
could find a company’s public statements regarding a potential merger with another company
immaterial as a matter of law without ever directly assessing the importance of the statements to

endorsement of the view that judicial expansion of Rule 10b-5 had gone too far. 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) (“There
has been widespread recognition that litigation under rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in
degree and kind from that which accompanies litigation in general.”)
75
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
76
Id. at 445.
77
Id. at 448.
78
Id. at 449. According to the Court, such importance “does not require proof of a substantial likelihood
that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard
does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would
have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Id.
79
Id. at 450 (quoting John Hopkins U. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (D. Md. 1970)).
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investors.80 Several years later, after other lower courts had adopted the Third Circuit’s singlefactor materiality test, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson and
rejected the test.81 After holding that TSC Industries provided the appropriate definition of
materiality in the context of Rule 10b-5, the Court found the Third Circuit’s test was
fundamentally inconsistent with that definition:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the
exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of application
alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and
Congress’ policy decisions. Any approach that designates a single fact or
occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact specific finding such as
materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.82
B. The Supreme Court’s Articulation of the Traditional Doctrinal Framework in Virginia
Bankshares
Neither TSC Industries nor Basic involved forward-looking information. In fact, the
Court in Basic distinguished the non-predictive soft information at issue from “other kinds of
contingent of speculative information, such as earnings forecasts or projections.” Consequently,
Basic left open the possibility that single-factor materiality tests for forward-looking information
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See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
485 U.S. 224, 230-241 (1998).
82
Id. at 236. The emergence in the lower courts of bright-line tests occurred in the context of materiality
assessments regarding non-forward-looking information. As noted above, courts generally assumed the materiality
of disclosed projections and were rarely were compelled to question that assumption. Several circuit courts that
addressed the materiality of undisclosed projections during this time period, however, applied heightened materiality
standards to find those projections immaterial. Notwithstanding the SEC’s position against requiring issuers to
disclose projections, the courts in these cases accepted the plaintiffs’ contention that defendants were under a
general duty to disclose all material information related to a certain subject. Thus, to hold that the defendants had
not violated this general duty, the courts had to find that the internal projections at issue were immaterial. In the
1978 case of James v. Gerber Products Co., for example, the Sixth Circuit first stated that TSC Industries made the
reasonable investor inquiry mandatory but then after noting that “[t]he undisclosed information in dispute . . . is
comprised of interim earnings figures that circulated through Gerber in the normal course of its business,” held that
“[s]uch sales figures, projections, forecasts and the like only rise to the level of materiality when they can be
calculated with substantial certainty.” 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978). In its 1984 opinion in Flynn v. Bass
Brothers Enterprise Inc., the Third Circuit also began by reciting the TSC Industries materiality definition and then
stated that it saw “no reason not to utilize the same formulation for evaluating materiality in the context of a tender
offer.” 744 F.2d 978, 984 (1984). The court ultimately held, however, that in the case of undisclosed projections,
the TSC Industries materiality test requires a court to balance “the potential aid such information will give a
shareholder against the potential harm, such as undue reliance, if the information is released without a proper
cautionary note.” Id. at 988. Instead of inventing materiality tests inconsistent with TSC Industries, these courts
should have developed exceptions to the applicable duty to disclose all material information.
81
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might still pass muster.83 Three years later, when the Supreme Court again addressed materiality
in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, the Court’s opinion should have finally foreclosed that
possibility.84 In Virginia Bankshares, directors of a bank solicited proxies for approval of the
bank’s merger into its parent, which owned 85% of the bank’s shares. After the transaction was
consummated, a minority shareholder of the bank sued the bank and its directors asserting that
the proxy statement was materially misleading in violation Exchange Act Rule 14a-9. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the shareholder. In particular, the
Court of Appeals found materially misleading the proxy statement’s assertions that the Plan of
Merger had been approved by the Board of Directors because it provided an opportunity for the
Bank’s public shareholders to achieve a “high” value for their shares and that the $42 per share
merger price was “fair.”85 Before the Supreme Court, the bank argued both that such
“statements of opinion or belief . . . cannot be actionable as misstatements of material fact . . .
within the meaning of Rule 14a-9” and that even if the statements could violate the rule, the
bank’s “high” and “fair” statements did not because the assertions were accompanied by
“statements of fact sufficient to enable readers to draw their own independent conclusions.”86
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Besides the Third Circuit in Trump, several other Circuit courts have applied single-factor materiality
tests to forward-looking information. In Helwig v. Vencor, for example, an en banc Sixth Circuit case, a six member
dissent argued that the Circuit’s substantial certainty test developed in the context of undisclosed projections applied
to disclosed projections as well. 251 F.3d 540, 546 (6th Cir. 2001). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly
used a single-factor “guarantee” materiality test to affirm dismissal of complaints alleging false projections.
According to this test, a projection is immaterial unless its presentation suggests to the investor that management has
guaranteed the predicted results. See e.g., Hillison Partners Ltd. P’Ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1994)
and Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993). These two single-factor materiality tests have remained
largely confined to the Sixth and Fourth Circuits.
84
501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
85
Id. at 1088-1089.
86
Id. at 1090.
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Although the Court did not attach the “forward-looking statement” label to the board’s
statements, it clearly recognized that the statements were, at least in part, forward-looking.87
Taking the bank’s actionability argument first,88 the Court demonstrated through an
articulation of the traditional framework that the bank’s “opinion” statements could qualify as
misstatements of fact: “[Opinion statements are] factual in two senses: as statements that the
directors do . . . hold the belief stated and as statements about the subject matter of the . . . belief
expressed.”89 The first sense identified by the court is a straightforward application of the
traditional doctrinal framework. Because it is reasonable for an investor to infer from the
publication of an opinion statement by management that management in fact holds the opinion
published, if that inference is incorrect the opinion statement itself qualifies as a factual
misstatement.
The second sense in which an opinion statement is factual, as a statement “about its
subject matter,” likewise grows out of the traditional doctrinal framework. The bank argued that
the statements were not factual in this sense because they were not expressed in “dollars and
cents, but focused instead on the ‘indefinite and unverifiable’ term, ‘high’ value.”90 Rejecting
this argument, the Court described the meaning of “subject matter” it had in mind:
[This] objection ignores the fact that such conclusory terms in a commercial
context are reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis that justifies them as
accurate, the absence of which renders them misleading. Provable facts either
furnish good reasons to make a conclusory judgment, or they count against it, and
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For example, the Court observed that “whether $42 was ‘high,’” depended upon “actual and potential
levels of operation.” Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
88
The Court easily concluded that management’s statements of opinion could be material. After briefly
discussing the importance to investors required for materiality under TSC Industries, the Court stated: “We think
there is no room to deny that . . . a statement of belief by corporate directors about a recommended course of action .
. . can take on just that importance. Shareholders know that directors usually have knowledge and expertness far
exceeding the normal investor’s resources . . . . ” Id. at 1090-1091.
89
Id. at 1092.
90
Id. at 1093.
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expressions of such judgments can be uttered with knowledge of truth or falsity
just like more definite statements. . . .91
In other words, because it is reasonable for shareholders and investors to infer from
management’s publication of its judgment about a certain matter that the judgment rests on a
factual basis, if this inference is incorrect the judgment statement itself qualifies as a factual
misstatement.92 Applying this approach to the bank’s “high” and “fair” value statement, the
Court found that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff warranted the conclusion “that the
statement was misleading about its subject matter and a false expression of the director’s reasons
[for recommending the merger to shareholders].”93
The Court then turned to the bank’s argument that its statements were not actionable
because the proxy statement contained “statements of fact sufficient to enable readers to draw
their own independent conclusions.”94 Although the Court could have read this allegation to
pertain to the “falsity” of the bank’s statements, it chose instead to read the allegation as an
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Id.
It follows from the Court’s discussion that material falsity of either “sense” should be sufficient to trigger
liability. The Court, however, held that where statements are not also false as to “subject matter,” a plaintiff may
not prevail solely on “proof of mere disbelief or belief undisclosed:” “[T]o recognize liability on mere disbelief or
undisclosed motive without any demonstration that the . . . statement was false or misleading about its subject would
authorize . . . litigation confined solely to what one skeptical court spoke of as the ‘impurities’ of a director’s
‘unclean heart.’ This, we think, would cross the line that Blue Chip Stamps sought to draw. . . .[T]he temptation to
rest an otherwise nonexistent . . . action on psychological enquiry alone would threaten just the sort of strike suits
and attrition by discovery that Blue Chip Stamps sought to discourage.” Id. at 1096 (citing Stedman v. Storer, 308
F.Supp. 881, 887 (SDNY 1969) (dealing with § 10(b)). The same concerns regarding “strike suits and attrition by
discovery” would later motivate Congress’ enactment of the PSLRA. As discussed infra Part IV, Virginia
Bankshares’ response to these concerns foreshadows a necessary adjustment to the contours of a PSLRA safe harbor
interpretation based on the traditional doctrinal framework. It is also worth noting that the court’s “psychological”
and “subject matter” senses of falsity mirror the good faith and reasonable basis elements of Rule 175. The
“misstatement of the psychological fact” that a manager holds the opinions he is stating and the absence of “good
faith” are forms of what is often referred to as subjective falsity. Implicit “subject matter” or “reasonable basis”
misrepresentations, on the other hand, are both forms of objective falsity. The conjunctive nature of Rule 175
suggests that, in contrast to the view of the Virginia Bankshares Court, the Commission believed that liability could
be based on subjective falsity alone.
93
Id. at 1094.
94
Id. at 1097.
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assertion that the “high” and “fair” value statements were immaterial.95 This decision
precipitated the Court’s development of analytically clear precedent regarding the appropriate
materiality standard for forward-looking information accompanied by disclosures pertaining to
the “subject matter” of the prediction:
While a misleading statement will not always lose its deceptive edge simply by
joinder with others that are true, the true statements may discredit the other one so
obviously that the risk of real deception drops to nil. Since liability under § 14(a)
must rest not only on deceptiveness but materiality as well . . . petitioners are on
perfectly firm ground insofar as they argue that publishing accurate facts in a
proxy statement can render a misleading proposition too unimportant to ground
liability. But not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. . . .
Only when the inconsistency would exhaust the misleading conclusion’s capacity
to influence the reasonable shareholder would a § 14(a) action fail on the element
of materiality.96
After settling on this framework for assessing the impact of accompanying statements on a
misleading statement’s materiality, the court required little effort to find that the bank’s
accompanying statements did not substantially diminish the importance of the bank’s assertions
that the deal offered shareholders a “high” and “fair” value: “Suffice it to say that the evidence
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In other words, the Court read the bank’s pleadings to assert that even assuming the use of the word
“high” was an inaccurate statement of the directors’ opinions, that inaccuracy was immaterial. The Court might
have read this contention to assert that the accompanying “statements of fact” (notwithstanding the omission of
other relevant facts) gave shareholders an accurate picture of what the directors believed when they stated that $42
was a “high” price or, in other words, that, taken in context, the use of the word “high” was not misleading. Neither
of these two analyses of the impact of accompanying disclosure is reducible to the other. When a court reads an
asserted defense based on accompanying statements in terms of falsity, then its discussion should focus on what
investors should have understood the prediction or opinion to mean in the context of the accompanying statements.
In contrast, where the defendant contends that accompanying statements rendered a prediction or opinion
immaterial, the defendant is asking the court to assume for purposes of the contention that the statement is false and
to assess whether the false impression created by the statement really mattered to investors. Because it adopted the
latter approach, the Virginia Bankshares Court assumed that the proposed deal did not offer a “high” value under
any reasonable interpretation of that term. To find this statement was immaterial, the court would have had to
conclude that the accompanying statements so clearly demonstrated that the proposed deal did not offer a “high”
value that no reasonable investor would have given any credence to the contrary statement in the proxy materials.
96
Id. at 1097-1098.
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invoked by [the bank] in the instant case fell short of compelling the jury to find the facial
materiality of the misleading statement neutralized.”97
Two observations regarding the Court’s description of the circumstances under which
accompanying disclosures may render an opinion statement immaterial bear mention here. First,
the description is consistent with TSC Industries and Basic. If after undertaking the “delicate
assessment” required by TSC Industries of the impact of the disclosures on an inaccurate opinion
or forward-looking statement, a judge or jury finds that the accompanying disclosures “discredit”
the statement “so obviously that the risk of real deception drops to nil,” the statement may be
properly deemed immaterial. In other words, an opinion or prediction is immaterial when the
accompanying disclosures prevent reasonable investors from drawing any inference from the
projection’s disclosure that would “assume[] actual significance in [their] deliberations.”98
Second, the Court’s materiality analysis will almost never be useful to a defendant seeking to
avoid liability for an inaccurate prediction. Situations in which an issuer’s accompanying
disclosures obviously discredit a published prediction are very rare if they exist at all. It difficult
to conceive of circumstances, for example, in which a company press release providing earnings
guidance might contain other statements that discredit the guidance. The same is true of all types
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Id. In addition, it is not clear from the facts of the Virginia Bankshares case that the $42 fair price
statement would have been rendered immaterial even if the Board had disclosed the omitted facts relating to the
subject matter of the $42 fair price statement. One of those omitted facts was that the market for the Bank’s shares
was “closed, thin, and dominated by [a single large shareholder].” 501 U.S. at 1093. Another was evidence of a
“going concern” value of more than $60 per share. In the absence of these disclosures, a reasonable investor,
depending on his prior understanding of the Bank’s business and trading history, may have inferred either (1) that
the $42 per share merger price reflected a higher value than the Bank’s value as a going concern or (2) that
notwithstanding the Bank’s higher value as a going concern, other factors made the merger at the $42 price
compelling, including, perhaps, that the merger represented shareholders’ only liquidity opportunity for the
foreseeable future. Disclosure of the evidence of a going concern value of more than $60 and of the thinness of the
trading market obviously would have rendered the first inference unreasonable. The disclosure would not
necessarily have made the second inference unreasonable, however, and because this inference likely would have
assumed actual significance in the minds of reasonable investors, the Board’s statement that $42 represented a fair
value would likely have remained material.
98
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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of projections intentionally published by issuers whether in press releases, SEC filings, or other
written format.99
C. The Third Circuit’s Conversion of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine Into a Materiality Test in
In Re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation100
The Virginia Banksharesdiscussion of the “sen ses” in which management’s published
beliefs or opinions may qualify as factual misstatements was a relatively complete, if somewhat
obscure, articulation of the traditional doctrinal framework. Accordingly, the case should have
led courts to apply the framework in subsequent cases involving allegedly misleading forward
looking information. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Instead, Virginia Bankshares, as
misread by the Third Circuit in Trump two years later, to some extent inspired the Third Circuit’s
materiality-based version of the bespeaks caution doctrine. The Trump defendants formed a
partnership for the acquisition and completion of the Taj Mahal casino in Atlantic City.101 The
Taj Mahal construction was completed but the partnership was ultimately unable to service the
debt.102 When the plaintiffs learned that the partnership planned to file for bankruptcy
protection, they sued alleging that the prospectus covering the bond issuance was materially
misleading because the defendants had “neither an honest belief in nor a reasonable basis [for]”
the partnership’s prediction in the prospectus that “funds generated from the operation of the Taj
Mahal will be sufficient to cover all of its debt service (interest and principal).”103

99

The Court’s holding may be useful in the case of the over-exuberant executive prone to making off-thecuff projections. The Court’s analysis suggests that the executive’s company or the executive himself could render
any inaccuracies in such projections immaterial by immediately correcting the projection in a way that obviously
discredits it.
100
7 F.3d 357 (1993).
101
Id. at 364.
102
Id. at 365.
103
Id. at 366. The plaintiffs buttressed this contention with allegations that “1) the Taj Mahal required an
average ‘casino win’ of approximately $1.3; 2) Donald Trump had personally guaranteed hundreds of millions of
dollars in bank loans for other properties; and 3) the Taj Mahal had an ‘unprecedented’ debt to equity ratio,” none of
which was disclosed in the prospectus. Id.
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After summarizing earlier bespeaks caution cases, the district court concluded that the
cases established per se rule against the actionability of projections accompanied by cautionary
language such as that contained the defendants’ prospectus.104 The court then acknowledged the
“troubling possibility” that such a doctrine would “encourage management to conceal deliberate
misrepresentations beneath the mantle of broad cautionary language.”105 The court therefore
held that the per se rule should only be triggered by “precise cautionary language which directly
addressed itself to future projections, estimates or forecasts in a prospectus.”106
On appeal, the Third Circuit multiplied the district court’s errors. Failing to perceive the
common doctrinal framework underlying the holdings in the previous bespeaks caution cases and
the Virginia Bankshares’ discussion of the “senses” in which a management’s published
judgments may be factual and therefore false, the Third Circuit instead linked the bespeaks
caution doctrine to the separate discussion in Virginia Bankshares of the impact of
accompanying disclosures on an opinion statement’s materiality: “[B]y recognizing that an
accompanying statement may neutralize the effect of a misleading statement, the [Virginia
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In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation, 793 F.Supp. 543 (N.J. 1992). The district court
began its analysis by reviewing the “origins of the ‘Bespeaks Caution’ approach.” Id. at 549. After citing Polin and
briefly discussing Luce, the court turned to “recent developments in the bespeaks caution doctrine” and summarized
the four 1991 circuit court bespeaks caution cases discussed supra Part II. Id. at 549-551. The court then described
the conflict between the parties’ positions as follows: “[Plaintiffs] argue that they have adequately pled [that the
prospectus contained misrepresentations]. . . . However, defendants maintain that a prospectus which ‘bespeaks
caution’ displaces a misrepresentation claim. . . . Thus, we must decide which comes first in our consideration of
this case: the cautionary language of the prospectus, or the allegation of misrepresentation in the complaint.” Id. at
552. The court then stated its view that, properly applied, the “‘bespeaks caution’ analysis would subsume or
obviate the analysis regarding adequate allegations of falsity” and cited the following instruction from Sinay v.
Lamson as support for this proposition: “[I]n determining whether the statements are actionable, the court must
scrutinize the nature of the statement to determine whether the statement was false when made. While analyzing the
nature of the statement, the court must emphasize whether ‘the prediction suggested reliability, bespoke caution, was
made in good faith, or had a sound factual or historical basis.’” Id. at 553. In the district court’s view, by using the
word “emphasize” and including whether a statement bespoke caution among its list of considerations, the Sixth
Circuit “indicat[ed] that such a factor is at lease a powerful consideration and may even be dispositive.” Id.
105
Id. at 554.
106
Id.
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Bankshares] court impliedly accepted the logic of the bespeaks caution doctrine.”107 As a result,
the Third Circuit asserted that the reasoning of Virginia Bankshares “support[ed]”108 its version
of the bespeaks caution doctrine, which it described as “essentially shorthand for the wellestablished principle that a statement or omission must be considered in context, so that
accompanying statements may render it immaterial as a matter of law.”109
Because the Third Circuit so explicitly based its “bespeaks caution” analysis on
materiality, the distinctiveness of the court’s approach from the reasoning in the prior bespeaks
caution cases is unmistakable despite the general lack of rhetorical precision in the earlier
bespeaks caution opinions. For example, after choosing its materiality-based approach, the Third
Circuit began its analysis with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s definition of materiality in
TSC Industries.110 In contrast, none of the prior circuit court bespeaks caution opinions
contained any reference to TSC Industries. Following its discussion of TSC Industries, the Third
Circuit cited each of the 1991 circuit court bespeaks caution cases and then asserted that the
lower court had only “followed the lead” of these courts, which “dismissed securities fraud
claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because cautionary language in the offering document negated the
materiality of an alleged misrepresentation.”111 Not surprisingly, however, the court did not
quote any language from the courts’ opinions or discuss other aspects of the cases that could
suggest that the judges in those cases understood the cautionary language in question to “negate[]
the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation.” Nevertheless, purportedly on the basis of these
cases, the court concluded “as a general matter” that:
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7 F.3d at 372.
Id.
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Id. at 364.
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Id. at 369.
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Id. at 371.
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When an offering document’s forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied
by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will not
form the basis for a securities fraud claim if those statements did not affect the
“total mix” of information the document provided investors. In other words,
cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged . . . misrepresentations
immaterial as a matter of law.112
Although this statement has nothing to do with the logic of the pre-1993 bespeaks caution
decisions, the statement faithfully summarizes the Virginia Bankshares’ holding that
accompanying disclosures may so obviously discredit an estimate that it ceases to assume actual
significance in the minds of investors. Such information would indeed fail to impact the total
mix of information affecting investment decisions regarding the security in question. If the error
in the Third Circuit’s analysis had been nothing more than mislabeling the Virginia Bankshares
materiality analysis as an application of the bespeaks caution doctrine, the court’s decision may
have done little harm. Had the Third Circuit actually applied the Virginia Bankshares
materiality analysis to theTrump facts, however, it could not have affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the case. As noted above, the plaintiffs’ primary allegation was that the statement in
the prospectus of the Partnership’s prediction that “funds generated from the operation of the Taj
Mahal will be sufficient to cover all of its debt service”113 was materially misleading. Neither
the defendants nor the court asserted that the accompanying disclosures in the prospectus so
obviously discredited this prediction that its capacity to influence potential buyers of the debt
was exhausted. In fact, both the parties and the court apparently understood that the investors
chose to invest in the bonds, notwithstanding the risks disclosed in the prospectus, precisely
because they accepted the Partnership’s view that the likelihood that cash flows from operations
would be sufficient to repay the debt was great enough to accept those risks. In other words, this
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Id.
Id. at 366.
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prediction was not just a material motivation for the investors’ decision to invest, it was the
primary motivation. Accordingly, if the statement was actually false as the plaintiffs alleged, it
was impossible for the Third Circuit to apply the Virginia Banksharesmateriality holding to
dismiss the plaintiffs’ case. Because the Third Circuit was unwilling to question its mistaken
premise that under the bespeaks caution doctrine accompanying statements negate the materiality
of a projection, this impossibility forced the court to develop a substitute test for the assessment
required by Virginia Bankshares of whether “the inconsistency would exhaust the misleading
conclusion’s capacity to influence the reasonable shareholder.” In the district court’s conclusion
that the “bespeaks caution doctrine applies only to precise cautionary language which directly
addresses itself to future projections,”114 the Third Circuit found the content. By slightly altering
the language of the district court’s per se rule, the Third Circuit converted the rule into a new
single-factor “bespeaks caution” materiality test: “To suffice, the cautionary statements must be
substantive and tailored to the specific future projections, estimates or opinions . . . which the
plaintiffs challenge.”115 Applying the new test to facts before it, the court held “that the plaintiffs
have failed to state an actionable claim regarding the statement that the Partnership believed it
could repay the bonds. We can say that the prospectus here truly bespeaks caution . . . . [T]he
cautionary statements were tailored precisely to address the uncertainty concerning the
Partnership’s prospective ability to repay the bondholders.”116
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In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation, 793 F.Supp. 543, 554 (N.J. 1992).
7 F.3d at 371-372.
116
Id. at 372. That the debt service prediction in the partnership’s prospectus was material under an
application of the Virginia Bankshares materiality test does not mean that the plaintiffs’ complaint should have
withstood the defendant’s 12b-6 motion. Had the Third Circuit applied the traditional doctrinal framework it may
well have found that the accompanying disclosures made any potentially misleading inferences unreasonable and
thus that the prediction itself, although inaccurate, was not misleading. For example, had the Trump plaintiffs
asserted that they inferred from the debt service predictions that repayment was very likely, or even more likely than
not, it is quite possible that the court could have found that this inference was unreasonable in light of the
accompanying disclosures, which the Court correctly observed did “address the uncertainty concerning the
Partnership’s prospective ability to repay the bondholders.” In the terminology of Virginia Bankshares, inferences
115
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Unlike prior single-factor materiality tests, which remained confined to the circuits in
which they developed, the Third Circuit’s reformulated bespeaks caution doctrine was quickly
absorbed into the case law of other circuits. Between 1993 and 1995, most lower courts that
used the “bespeaks caution” phrase cited Trump’s statement that “cautionary language, if
sufficient, renders the alleged . . . misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law” as an
accurate description of the bespeaks caution doctrine.117 Not surprisingly, this wide-spread
judicial acceptance of the Third Circuit’s materiality-based bespeaks caution doctrine gradually
spilled over into ongoing Congressional deliberations regarding reform the nation's private
securities litigation system.118 For example, a June 1995 report by the Senate’s Committee on

drawn from the publication of the prediction regarding the likelihood of debt service are inferences regarding the
“subject matter” of the prediction. The Trump plaintiffs apparently emphasized the other “sense” in which an
opinion or prediction may be factual and therefore false, namely, as “a misstatement of the psychological fact of the
speaker’s belief in what he says.” Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092 (1991). Again, had the
Third Circuit applied the traditional doctrinal framework to the plaintiff’s allegation that this implied representation
was false, it could have required the plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of inside information suggesting that
revenues from operations would almost certainly be inadequate to service the bonds. Because the issue in Trump
was the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the court could have required the plaintiffs to make particularized
factual allegations from which a legal inference that such inside information existed at the time of the offering could
be drawn. The plaintiffs’ alleged that just such information existed with respect to another projection in the
prospectus, which estimated “that as of its opening date the Taj Mahal would be worth approximately $1.1 billion.”
Id. at 373. The estimate was based on a third-party appraisal. The allegation stated that the third party had used an
irrational appraisal method and that the use of this method was not disclosed. Id. The court held that the cautionary
language regarding the estimate still met its “substantive and tailored” test, but, perhaps sensing the weakness of its
materiality-based approach, added: “We further note that the plaintiff’s allegation concerning the appraisal report
fails to satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).” Id.
117
See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166-167 (5th Cir. 1994) and Saltzberg v. TM
Sterling/Austin Accocs., 45 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1995).
118
The first securities litigation reform bills were introduced in 1993. See S. 3181 102nd Cong. (1992);
H.R. 417 103rd Cong. (1993); and S. 1976 103rd Cong. (1994). Around the same time, the Commission began
considering changes to the Rule 175 safe harbor. In 1994, the Commission issued a concept release and solicited
pu
blic comment regarding whether the Rule 175 safe harbor was “effective in encouraging disclosure of voluntary
forward-looking information and protecting investors or, if not, [whether it] should be revised. . . .” Safe Harbor for
Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No. 33,7101 (Oct. 13, 1994) at 9. The release began by
reasserting the Commission’s position on the importance to investors of projections: “Forward-looking information
occupies a vital role in the United States securities markets. Investors typically consider management’s forwardlooking information important and useful in evaluating a company’s economic prospects and consequently in
makingtheir investment decisions. Analysts and other market participants report that they view consideration of
management’s own performance projections, i.e., earnings and revenues, to be critical to their own forecasts of a
company’s future performance. As such, forward-looking information is often considered a critical component of
investment recommendations made by broker-dealers, investment advisers and other securities professionals.” Id. at
1. After Republicans took control of the House of Representatives in 1994, party leaders made elimination of
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Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on proposed securities litigation reform legislation quoted
at length Trump’s description of the doctrine as a materiality-based approach to evaluating
inaccurate forward-looking statements and singled-out Trump as an “oft-cited” bespeaks caution
case.119 Similarly, the December 1995 conference committee report on H.R. 1058 (which
ultimately became the PSLRA after Congress voted to override a veto of the bill by President
Clinton) reflects the assumption by members of the Committee thatthe legal significance of
statements accompanying a prediction is their impact on the prediction’s materiality.120
IV.

INTERPRETING THE PSLRA SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING LIABILITY FOR INACCURATE PREDICTIONS

The widespread assumption among members of Congress that the bespeaks caution
doctrine developed as a materiality-based approach to forward-looking information led members
of the H.R. 1058 conference committee to also assume thatby adoptinga “meaningful
cautionary statements” safe harbor provision Congress would establisha statutory formula for
rendering predictions immaterial. Nothing in the legislative history of the PSLRA, however,
suggests that this view was based on any deliberations regarding the distinctions between

perceived abuses in private securities litigation a key objective in their broader private civil litigation reform
campaign. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at [43] (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741. In early 1995,
House Republicans introduced a new securities litigation reform bill that was much more aggressive than the earlier
proposals. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995). H.R. 10 would have become the “Common Sense Legal Reform Act of
1995.” Title I of the bill dealt with product liability reform and Title II with private securities litigation reform. As
the year wore on, however, most of the provisions in Title II were softened or replaced entirely through efforts to
create broader congressional support for the reforms. In the end, a compromise bill passed by the House and Senate
garnered sufficient support to override a veto of the bill by President Clinton. See generally H.R. 1058, 104th Cong.
(1995). For a chronology of events leading to the enactment of the PSLRA, see John W. Avery, Securities
Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus.
Law. 335 (1996).
119
1995 Committee Reports, p. 12, June 19, 1995.
120
After discussing the types of information that should qualify accompanying statements as “meaningful”
for purposes of the first prong of the safe harbor, the Committee’s report states: “Courts may continue to find a
] (1995). Although
forward-looking statement immaterial . . . on other grounds.” H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, [43
this statement is somewhat ambiguous, it appears to reflect the assumption that judicial application of the bespeaks
caution doctrine might in some instances render a statement immaterial even though the accompanying statements in
question did not satisfy the first prong of the safe harbor. This reading of the statement is confirmed by a
subsequent section of the report that notes the Committee did “not intend for the safe harbor provisions to replace
the judicial ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine or to foreclose further development of that doctrine by the courts.” Id.
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materiality-based and falsity-based evaluations of forward-looking information. In fact, there is
no indication in the legislative history that any of the legislatorsgrasped that the legal relevance
of accompanying statements could be conceptualized in any terms other than materiality.
Instead, it appears that members of Congress simply took as granted Trump’s assertion that the
primary relevance of accompanying cautionary language is its impact on a projection’s
materiality because cases subsequent to Trump gave them no reason to questions this assertion.
The safe harbor language that Congress enacted, however, does not clearly require a
materiality-based approach to evaluating whether issuers should be liable if their published
predictions turn out to be wrong. Instead, congressional negotiations and ultimately unsuccessful
attempts to satisfy the concerns of the Clinton White House about the language of the safe harbor
produced a set of provisions that is both less precise and more complex than the safe harbor
provisions contained in earlier reform bills. The full text of the “meaningful cautionary
statements” prong provides that an issuer “shall not be liable with respect to any forward looking
statement . . . if and to the extent that the forward-looking statement is identified as a forwardlooking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forwardlooking statement.”121 To this prong, the safe harbor adds two other provisions which protect an
issuer from liability for an inaccurate forward-looking statement if the statement is “immaterial”
or if the speaker who made the statement did not have “actual knowledge . . . that the statement
was false or misleading.”122
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15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(1) (Supp. I 1995).
Id. Subsection (c)(2) extends, with certain qualifications, the principles of subsection c(1) to oral
forward looking statements. Id. at §78u-5(c)(2) (Supp. I 1995).
122
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Referring to these and other provisions of the PSLRA, Professor John Coffee argued in
1996 that, with its many “ambiguous gaps and statutory hiatuses,” the Reform Act was like “wet
clay . . . shaped into an approximation of a human form” that would becomeeither “high art” or
“competent mediocrity” in the hands of the courts.123 Unfortunately, the judiciary’s interpretive
work to date with respect to the safe harbor provisions falls far short of high art. The lower
courts are no closer now to a uniform approach to evaluating liability for inaccurate forwardlooking statements than they were in 1997 when the first complaints implicating the PSLRA
were filed. In many cases, judges have attempted to interpret the language of the safe harbor
provisions without reference to pre-PSLRA case law.124 Not surprisingly given the ambiguous
nature of the statutory terms “important” and “meaningful,” this approach has produced
inconsistent results. When judges have instead looked to pre-PSLRA cases for guidance, they
have failed to distinguish and separately evaluate the alternative interpretative frameworks
suggested by pre-PSLRA case law and regulatory materials.125 The course beyond the prevailing
“competent mediocrity” in the case law regarding the safe harbor must begin with a clear
articulation of the differences between these alternative frameworks and the selection of one as
the starting point for all assessments of liability for inaccurate forward-looking information
subject to the safe harbor. By outlining the shortcomings of the materiality-based interpretation
of the “meaningful cautionary statements” safe harbor provision and demonstrating that an
interpretation properly rooted in the traditional doctrinal framework resolves these defects, this
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John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady
Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 975 (1996).
124
See, e.g., Asher v. Baxter International, Inc., 377 F.3d 727 (2004); Miller v. Champion Enterprises, Inc.,
346 F.3d 660 (6th Cir., 2003); and Elhert v. Singer, 245 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001).
125
In many cases, courts have cited cases applying materiality-based approaches and falsity-based
approaches together as if the cases conformed to a single analytical framework. See, e.g., In re: Immune Response
Securities Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12602, *117-128 (S.D. Cal. 2005); In re: Regeneron Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1350, *42-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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part argues that the traditional framework is the best available alternative for interpreting the
PSLRA safe harbor.
As discussed in Part I, the most obvious problem with reading the first safe harbor
provision as a formula for rendering predictive information immaterial is the inability of this
approach to connect the provision to the safe harbor’s stated policy goal of enhancing allocative
efficiency.126 A safe harbor that leads companies to increase disclosures of only immaterial
information will have little impact on the accuracy of equity prices on which allocative
efficiency depends. The only response to this criticism is that some forward-looking information
deemed immaterial under the Trump’s materiality framework will still influence investor
decision-making. This response, however, amounts to an acknowledgement that the framework
does not really filter forward-looking information according to its importance to investors or, in
other words, that the Trump framework is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s definition of
materiality. Of course, Congress has the power to replace the Court’s definition of materiality
with a definition of its own. Accordingly, this apparent defect of the Trump-based interpretation
could be overlooked if other interpretive criteria suggested that the statutory language of the
PSRLA safe harbor can only be interpreted as the outcome of a deliberate legislative effort to
redefine materiality for purposes of forward-looking information.
Besides maintaining a logical relationship between policy objectives and statutory means,
any proposed interpretation of the safe harbor ought to also satisfy at least the following three
criteria: (1) because the provisions are disjunctive, the interpretations of the three safe harbor
provisions taken together ought to ensure that each provision protects some set of forward-
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This criticism would apply with even greater force to an interpretation of the first provision that takes
the provision as a codification of the Virginia Bankshares materiality analysis, under which, as discussed above,
statements are only immaterial if they obviously discredit the predictive information.
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looking statements that the other two provisions do not (in other words, none of the three prongs
should be rendered superfluous by the other two);127 (2) the interpretations of the three
provisions taken together ought to provide acceptable guidance to managers; and (3) the
interpretations taken together ought to be reasonable constructions of the statutory language.
Although little effort is required to satisfy any two of these three criteria, simultaneously
satisfying all three is more difficult than it may seem. For example, one can easily satisfy the
first and third criteria by interpreting the first safe harbor provision to immunize all predictions
that are not intentionally misleading, the second - statements that are immaterial under current
law, and the first - even intentionally misleading predictions accompanied by appropriate
cautionary statements. This set of interpretations fails to meet the second criterion, however,
because it invites managers to intentionally deceive the investing public. Similarly, one can
easily satisfy the first two criteria by using the same interpretations for the second and third
provisions but interpreting the first to immunize predictions accompanied by properly
constructed cautionary statements unless the prediction itself was intentionally misleading.
Because all statements immunized by the first provision are also immunized by the third
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In his discussion of the safe harbor soon after the enactment of the PSLRA, Professor Coffee highlighted
the challenge of finding independent significance for each of the provisions of the safe harbor as follows: “Probably
the most striking feature of the Reform Act’s safe harbor is the immunity it seems to give to a bald, knowing lie that
is surrounded by ‘meaningful cautionary statements’ . . . . Arguably, the [third] prong would add nothing and thus
be superfluous if the first prong did not protect a false statement that was accompanied by ‘meaningful cautionary
statements.’ As a matter of statutory interpretation, any reading of these two prongs that renders the [third] prong
superfluous must be avoided.” John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or,
Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 981 (1996). Although Coffee focuses on the danger that
the third prong could be rendered superfluous, the larger obstacle is finding relational significance for the first
prong. A provision is not superfluous if it immunizes some portion of the set of statements that are clearly not
immunized by either of the other two prongs. The third prong will have such relational significance under almost
any interpretation because by immunizing statements that the speaker did not actually know were false (regardless
of the quality of the accompanying disclosures) the third prong clearly covers a portion of the set of statements that
the first prong does not immunize (because they are either not accompanied by cautionary language or accompanied
by cautionary language that is inadequate). The second prong, of course, would also not immunize the statements so
long as they were material. Finding independent significance for the first prong is more difficult, however, because
the only statements that the third prong appears to leave unprotected are statements that the speaker did actually
know were false.
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provision under this set of interpretations, however, the interpretations render the first provision
superfluous and thus fail to satisfy the relational significance criterion.
Measured against the criteria of relational significance, reasonable construction, and
market guidance, the Trump-based framework continues to fare poorly. This framework would
give the first prong significance in relation to the third provision because the first provision
would immunize even a projection management actually knew was baseless so long as it was
accompanied by disclosures tailored to the subject matter of the projection. As in the first
example above, however, the guidance implicit in this approach is perverse. In any situation in
which the interests of managers favored publishing misleading disclosures, they could do so
without fear of liability so long as they could create content for accompanying statements that
facially tied into the subject matter of the projection. While this task may require more creativity
than attaching boilerplate warnings to projections, the effort required would hardly deter
executives bent on deceit from publishing misleading projections.128 For the same reason, a
Trump-based framework also fails to provide a reasonable construction of the statutory language
of the first provision; accompanying disclosures that are tailored to a forward-looking statement
yet fail to disclose contingencies management knows are more likely to cause a departure from
projected results would hardly strike a person aware of the omissions as “meaningful.”
Moreover, the Trump-based interpretation does not fully satisfy the criterion of relational
significance. If the first provision offers a formula for rendering projections immaterial, all
statements it immunizes are already immunized by the second provision. In other words,
although the interpretation clearly gives the first provision significance in relation to the third, it
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Whether the safe harbor under this interpretation would actually enhance market efficiency depends on
whether the positive effects of the resulting increase in “true when made” projections would outweigh the negative
effects of the increase in deliberately misleading projections caused by the safe harbor.
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fails to give the first provision significance in relation to the second. Accordingly, if Congress’
intended for the “meaningful cautionary statements” language to serve as content for a new
definition of materiality for purposes of forward-looking information, it should have passed a
two-prong safe harbor comprised of the “immateriality” and “actual knowledge” prongs of the
enacted safe harbor along with a separate provision defining “immaterial” statements to include
statements “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement.”
A properly constructed interpretation of the safe harbor rooted in the traditional doctrinal
framework avoids all of the defects to which the Trump-based interpretation is subject. Under
this interpretation, to demonstrate that a prediction falls outside the protection of the first safe
harbor provision a plaintiff must show that a reasonable investor would have drawn important
incorrect inferences from the publication of the prediction despite the disclosures in the
accompanying statements. If there are no important incorrect inferences that a reasonable
investor would have drawn from the prediction in light of the accompanying disclosures, the
disclosures should qualify as “meaningful cautionary statements.” Accordingly, clearly material
forward-looking information, the kind of information that is likely to enhance allocative
efficiency, may be protected by the first safe harbor provision under this interpretation.129
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Under this interpretation, the omission of an important factor or even of the most important factor would
not automatically render the remaining disclosures “meaningless,” particularly where disclosure of such information
would substantially undermine the company’s competitive position. On the other hand, an omission of one of the
most important factors that can only be explained by management’s intent to mislead investors ought to render the
remaining statements “meaningless.” Moreover, while courts arguably must take into account Congress’ intent “not
to provide an opportunity for plaintiffs’ counsel to conduct discovery on what was known to the issuer at the time
the forward-looking statement was made,” courts’ application of the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards ought
to adequately ensure that plaintiffs have a clear idea of what the defendants knew and how they knew it before they
are given access to discovery. For example, where a plaintiff asserts that the cautionary statements accompanying a
projection were not meaningful because an internal company report describes factors that were not contained in the
cautionary statements accompanying the projection, but which were much more likely to affect actual results than
the disclosed factors, a court could still dismiss the complaint under the pleading standards if the complaint does not
identify “the sources of [the plaintiff’s] information with respect to the reports, how [the plaintiff] learned of the
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In addition to being consistent with the underlying logic of the safe harbor, an
interpretation rooted in the traditional doctrinal framework clearly satisfies the acceptable
guidance and reasonable construction criteria. Interpreted in light of the traditional doctrinal
framework, the first provision would encourage managers seeking the protection of the provision
to disclose the information they believe will prevent reasonable investors from drawing incorrect
inferences from the projection’s publication and defining the terms “meaningful” and
“important” in terms of the propensity of the accompanying statements to prevent incorrect
inferences that investors might otherwise draw from the publication of the prediction requires no
stretching of these terms.130
With certain adjustments, the interpretation rooted in the traditional doctrinal framework
also satisfies the relational significance criterion. Because, under this interpretation,
accompanying statements render predictive statements “not misleading” rather than immaterial,
the interpretation clearly gives the first provision significance in relation to the “immateriality”
prong. For the same reason, however, the traditional doctrinal framework could fail to give the
first provision significance in relation to the third provision. As the Virginia Banksharesopinion
demonstrates, the traditional doctrinal framework yields the insight that a prediction can be false
either because the inference that management believes in the prediction is incorrect (as “a
misstatement of the psychological fact of the speaker’s belief in what he says”131) or because a
reasonable inference about the likelihood or magnitude of a departure from the predicted results

reports, who drafted them, or which officers received them.” In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970,
985 (9th Cir. 1999).
130
This approach also matches the following description by the Conference Committee of the intent of
these statutory terms better than the Trump “tailoring” criterion: “The cautionary statements must convey
substantive information about factors that realistically could cause results to differ materially from those projected in
the forward-looking statement, such as, for example, information about the issuer’s business.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO.
104-369, at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741.
131
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991).
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is incorrect (because the prediction is “misleading about its subject matter.”)132 If one applies
this view of falsity to the safe harbor, accompanying statements would fail to be “meaningful”
for purposes of the safe harbor if they failed to prevent either kind of inference. Accordingly,
whenever the third provision was unavailable (because the speaker had actual knowledge that the
statement was false) the first provision would necessarily be unavailable as well because the
inference that the speaker actually believed the prediction could not be correct.
Fortunately, Virginia Bankshares also suggests a solution to this interpretive problem.
Recognizing that, as a matter of theory, proof that a published opinion statement amounted to a
“misstatement of the psychological fact of the speaker’s belief in what he says”133 should suffice
for liability, the Virginia Bankshares Court decided against establishing this rule because “the
temptation to rest an otherwise nonexistent . . . action on psychological enquiry alone would
threaten . . . strike suits and attrition by discovery.”134 Incorporation of the same limitation into
the falsity-based interpretation of the first safe harbor prong carves out a narrow set of statements
that are protected by the first provision but not by the third, which is all that is necessary to
satisfy the criterion of relational significance.135 If evidence adduced by a plaintiff demonstrates

132

Id. This is generally not true with respect to factual statements about the past. If, for example, a
manufacturing company manager attempted to defraud investors by failing to disclose product defects reported
internally, his deceitful intent would not constitute fraud if the internal reports are incorrect and products are actually
free of defects. In the case of management’s opinions or predictions, however, investors must decide how much
weight to give the statements and, as a result, seek to understand the depth of management’s belief in the opinions or
predictions.
133
Id. at 1095.
134
Id. at 1096 (citing Stedman v. Storer, 308 F.Supp. 881, 887 (SDNY 1969) (dealing with § 10(b)). Note
that the two senses identified by the Court in which statements of opinion are factual mirror the good faith and
reasonable basis elements of Rule 175. By making both elements prerequisites to the protection of Rule 175, the
SEC suggested that it would be possible for a plaintiff to prevent even reasonably based projections from coming
within the safe harbor solely by showing that the speaker made them in bad faith.
135
That the first prong would only immunize a small set of statements left unprotected by the third prong
under this set of interpretations does not mean that reliance on the first prong would rarely make a difference in
practice. Managers at the same company often take different views of a company’s future. Accordingly, whatever
set of internal projections are ultimately disclosed by a company, they may frequently be inconsistent with the views
of one or more managers at the company. Particularized allegations of such inconsistencies might prevent a court
from relying on the third provision to dismiss a complaint at the pleading stage. The first provision, however, would
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management’s belief that a prediction was false but fails to show that a reasonable investor
would have drawn an important incorrect inference from the prediction’s publication, the first
safe harbor provision will immunize the statement even though the third will not.
It is fair to question whether the incorporation of this limitation into the safe harbor
interpretation does not give managers the same license to lie that, along with the other defects
discussed above, makes the Trump-based interpretation unacceptable. The basis for a negative
response to this question lies in the overlap between falsity evidence and evidence of the
defendant’s intent to mislead of scienter. In the context of securities fraud litigation, there are
two types of direct evidence of scienter: (1) internal memoranda, notes, emails, or other
documents that record officers’ beliefs concerning the subject matter of public statements and (2)
a manager’s testimony regarding his own deceitful state of mind when the allegedly false
statements were made. Both types of evidence are rare and the latter is extremely rare.
Accordingly, plaintiffs more commonly rely on indirect evidence of scienter. That is, to prove
scienter, plaintiffs argue that company officers knew or were reckless in failing to comprehend
that public statements were false because internal facts to which they were exposed were
inconsistent with their public statements. In other words, such “indirect” evidence of scienter is
simply direct evidence of falsity combined with evidence of personal exposureto that evidence .
Because of this evidentiary overlap, in most cases where evidence adduced demonstrates
management’s “actual knowledge” that a prediction was false, the same evidence will also
demonstrate that statements accompanying the prediction were not “meaningful” because they
failed to prevent important incorrect inferences a reasonable investor would have drawn about

continue to offer protection so long as management had properly disclosed the key assumptions on which the
prediction in question was based.
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the likelihood and extent of a departure of actual results from the predicted outcome. 136
Accordingly, as managers perpetrating a fraud through the use of baseless predictions leave a
trail of “actual knowledge” evidence they will generally be unable to avoid creating evidence of
the “meaninglessness” of the statements accompanying the predictions at the same time.
As discussed in Parts II and III, virtually all pre-1993 judicial and regulatory approaches
to forward-looking information conformed to a single doctrinal framework. Courts and
commentators have failed to recognize this common underlying framework (and the sharp
departure from the framework marked by Trump) largely because of the multiplication of
vocabularies that refer to the framework’s basic concepts. In other words, the use of the terms
“good faith” and “reasonable basis” in some forward-looking information cases, “bespeaks
caution” in others, and “subject matter” and “psychological facts” in still others has obscured the
conformity of the inquiries entailed by the use of any of these terms to a single doctrinal
framework. Moreover, none of these terms clearly reveals the nature of the framework’s
underlying analysis as first, an inquiry into the reasonableness and accuracy of unstated
propositions or inferences in light of disclosures accompanying the predictive statement and,
second, an inquiry into the importance of the inferences thatthe finder of fact finds reasonable
and inaccurate. Accordingly, by incorporating the content of these inquiries into a rule defining
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The Virginia Bankshares Court found that this limitation would not substantially restrict liability for
misleading statements of belief for essentially the same reasons: “[I]t would be rare to find a case with evidence
solely of disbelief or undisclosed motivation without further proof that the statement was defective as to its subject
matter. While we certainly would not hold a director’s naked admission of disbelief incompetent evidence of a
proxy statement’s false or misleading character, such an unusual admission will not very often stand alone, and we
do not substantially narrow the cause of action by requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate something false or misleading
in what the statement expressly or impliedly declared about its subject.” Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.
1083, 1096 (1991). Note, however, that the interpretation of the safe harbor provisions rooted in the traditional
doctrinal framework must go beyond codification of the Virginia Bankshares falsity analysis. Virginia Bankshares
apparently permits liability based on evidence that a statement “was false or misleading about its subject” in the
absence of evidence that the statements also represented a “misstatement of the psychological fact of the speaker’s
belief in what he says.” Because the safe harbor’s provisions are disjunctive, the provisions should foreclose this
possibility with respect to covered forward-looking information.
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the PSLRA safe harbor statutory term “meaningful,” the Commission could eliminate the
confusion caused bythe proliferation of materiality-based analyses of forward-looking
information following Trump and also force courts prepared to dismiss cases based on allegedly
misleading predictions to state explicitly that each of the incorrect inferences allegedly drawn by
the plaintiff from the prediction was either unreasonable or reasonable but immaterial.
Intervention by the Supreme Court in the right case could similarly rule out materiality-based
interpretations of the first safe harbor provision and precisely describe the inquiries that should
flow from a safe harbor interpretation rooted in the traditional framework. In either case, lower
courts, in turn, could generally require plaintiffs to allege with particularity the incorrect
inferences they drew at the time the prediction was made and why those inferences were
reasonable despite the accompanying disclosures. Finally, an authoritative regulatory or judicial
definition of the statutory term “meaningful” would also provide standards to which courts could
look in cases involving predictive information that is not covered by the PSLRA safe harbor,137
though such courts would be free from interpretive constraints posed by the language and
disjunctive structure of the safe harbor.138
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Subsection (a) of the PSLRA safe harbor limits the applicability of the safe harbor to public companies
and certain persons acting on their behalf. 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(a) (Supp. I 1995). Subsection (b) further limits the
applicability of the safe harbor by excluding statements made in certain circumstances, such as initial public
offerings, or by certain persons, such as felons convicted in the three years prior to the statement. Id. at §78u-5(b).
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For example, courts evaluating forward-looking information not covered by the safe harbor could
permit culpability less than “actual knowledge” to suffice for scienter.
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